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RECENT DECISIONS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE---AIRPORT DRUG SEIZURES: HOW THE
FEDERAL COURTS STRIKE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCE
The fourth amendment' forbids unreasonable seizures. In Terry
v. Ohio,2 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that
seizures are not inherently unreasonable. 3 Moreover, the Court
stated that not all interactions between the police and citizens are
seizures within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 4
In Terry, the Supreme Court allowed a limited government in-
trusion on an individual's privacy, justified by a standard less rigor-
ous than probable cause.5 This decision, which resulted from a
careful balancing process, has evolved into the reasonable suspicion
standard. 6 The general governmental interests included the preven-
tion and detection of crime, as well as the interest of the police in
protecting themselves and other potential victims from violence.
I "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3 The court said in Terry:
[w]e have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," he
is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, the
specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which
it is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures,
but unreasonable searches and seizures."
Id at 9 (citations omitted).
4 "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has oc-
curred." Id at 19 n.16.
The word "citizen" as used in Ter,, and this commentary, refers not only to United
States' citizens but to any individual who may come into contact with a police officer.'
5 The Court provided the following "objective standard" by which to judge whether a
particular intrusion was reasonably justified: "would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure. . . 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action
taken was appropriate?" Id at 21-22.
6 The Court said, as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the govern-
mental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails." Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967)).
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These societal interests were weighed against the personal privacy
interest invaded by a protective search for weapons. 7 The Court de-
termined the societal interests to be paramount.
Since Teny, the Supreme Court has continued to develop the
reasonable suspicion standard.8 Fourth amendment cases currently
focus on weighing the government's law enforcement interests
against the people's liberty interests. 9 The reasonable suspicion stan-
dard and its concommitant balancing process need not come into
play, however, until an individual has been "seized" by a govern-
ment official. In Tedrg, the Supreme Court did not have to rule on
the precise point in time at which the "seizure" occurred.10 In a
number of recent cases involving airport narcotics investigations,
however, determining the moment of seizure has become significant.
This commentary analyzes the federal courts' development of
the seizure concept in decisions involving police-citizen contacts in
airport settings.' 1 Part I examines the United States Supreme Court's
7 The Court nonetheless observed that a "protective search for weapons. . . constitutes
a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person." Id at 26.
8 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
9 For example, in Mimms, the Court determined that the government's interest in police
officers' safety outweighed the invasion of personal liberty resulting from compliance with an
officer's order that the driver get out of his car. The Court characterized this invasion of
liberty as de minimis. See 434 U.S. at 111. Compare the Court's balancing process in Brown,
which weighed in favor of the individual's freedom from police interference absent justifiable
suspicion of criminal activity. In Brown, two police officers had stopped the defendant in an
alley and demanded to see his identification without any specific basis for believing that he
had committed a crime. See 443 U.S. at 52.
10 After holding that Terry was clearly "seized" when Officer McFadden grabbed him,.
the Court noted: "[w]e thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an investigation 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or
interrogation." 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
11 There are numerous commentaries on the Terry decision and related fourth amend-
ment Supreme Court decisions. See generaly Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Caracappa, Terry v. Ohio and the Power of Police to Accost Citizens
Absent Probable Cause to Arrest: A Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Experience, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 499(1977-1978); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Teny, Sibron, Peters, and Byond, 67
MICH. L. REv. 40 (1969); Miles, From Terry to Mimms: The Unacknowledged Erosion of Fourth
Amendment Protections Surrounding Police-Citizen Confrontations, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (1978);
O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privaey: Principles andPolicies of Fourth Amendment-ProtectedPri
vaq,, 13 NEw ENG. L. REV. 662 (1978).
Other commentaries which discuss the application of the fourth amendment to searches
and seizures based on less than probable cause include: Costantino, Cannavo, & Goldstein,
Drug Courier Profiles andAirport Stops.- Is the Sky the Limit?, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 175 (1980);
Note, Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Is the Supreme Courtr Case of Confusion in
its Terminal Stage?, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 217 (1981); Comment, Reformulating Seizures-
Airport Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69 CALIF. L. R-V. 1486 (1981); Comment, State v.
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development of the seizure concept; Part II discusses the cases apply-
ing this seizure law in the United States Courts of Appeals; and Part
III reexamines the Supreme Court's seizure teaching in light of these
recent decisions.
I. The Supreme Court and The Seizure Concept
Several years ago the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
established airport surveillance programs aimed at detecting and in-
tercepting drug couriers. Typically, DEA agents have little time to
gather evidence or establish probable cause to arrest suspects who
pass through the nation's international airports. Thus, the airport
encounters between the police and suspects present timely fourth
amendment questions. In United States v. Mendenhall,12 the Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether a police officer's conduct
in approaching a suspected drug courier and requesting his identifi-
cation constitutes a fourth amendment seizure requiring objective
justification. 13 While the Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus
on the seizure issue, two justices suggested a "reasonable person test"
which attempts to clarify many of the seizure questions left unan-
swered by Tery and its progeny.
Reid Airport Searches and the Drug Courier Profile in Georgia, 33 MERCER L. REV. 433 (1981);
Comment, United States v. Mendenhall-DEA Airport Search and Seizure, 16 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 597 (1980-1981); Comment, Drug Tracking at Airports-The Judicil Response, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 91 (1981); Comment, Mendenhall and Reid: the Drug Courier Profile and Investigative
Stops, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 835 (1981); Comment, Criminal Profiles After United States v. Men-
denhall: How Well Founded a Suspicion?, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 557 (1981).
This recent decisions article will not replow ground already tilled by the above publica-
tions. Instead, it will focus on how recent federal decisions have impacted upon the seizure
test set out in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). This commentary will
analyze how that general test is being solidified by case law development in the Courts of
Appeal and how these decisions relate to the basic rationale behind that standard.
12 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
13 The Mendenhall facts illustrate the type of confrontation that frequently occurs in air-
ports between police officers and drug courier suspects. Two DEA agents monitering passen-
gers arriving at Detroit Metropolitan Airport observed the defendant disembark from a Los
Angeles flight. According to the agents, the defendant's behavior fit the "drug courier pro-
file," an informal compilation of traits normally associated with persons who transport illegal
narcotics. The officers approached the defendant, identified themselves as federal agents, and
asked to see her identification and airline ticket. Mendenhall produced a driver's license in
her correct name and an airline ticket issued in the name of "Annette Ford," a name she told
the agents she "just felt like using." One of the officers then identified himself specifically as a
narcotics agent, which caused Mendenhall to become visibly "shaken" and extremely "ner-
vous." The agent returned Mendenhall's ticket and license and asked if she would go with
him to the airport DEA office for further questioning. Mendenhall accompanied the agent to
his office, where she eventually consented to a strip search which revealed two small packages
hidden in her undergarments, one of which appeared to contain heroin. Id at 547-49.
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Relying heavily on Terry, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, stated that "a person has been seized within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave."14 Through this reasonable person test,
Justice Stewart attempted to construct a scale on which the courts
could balance the competing governmental and liberty interests in
any given police-citizen encounter. Justice Stewart acknowledged
the need for police contact with the public "as a tool in the effective
enforcement of criminal laws." 5 Yet he also recognized the fourth
amendment values involved in airport investigations, and he gave
examples of circumstances which would support a conclusion that a
person has been "seized" in an airport encounter under the reason-
able person analysis.' 6
Justice Stewart concluded that no seizure occurred in Mendenhall
and considered the following factors determinative: (1) the encounter
took place in a public concourse; (2) the agents neither wore
uniforms nor displayed weapons; (3) the agents did not summon the
respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identi-
fied themselves as federal agents; and (4) the agents requested rather
than demanded to see the respondent's identification and airline tick-
et. Justice Stewart noted that "such conduct, without more, did not
amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected
interest."' 7
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, concurred in the Mendenhall judgment but refused to consider
the initial seizure question since it had not been raised in the lower
court.18 Rather, Justice Powell assumed that a seizure had occurred
14 Id at 554.
15 Id
16 Even if the suspect did not attempt to leave, the following circumstances might never-
theless indicate a seizure: (1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) an officer dis-
playing a weapon; (3) some physical touching of the citizen; (4) a tone of voice or use of
language which implies that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. "In
the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the
public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person." Id at
554-55.
17 "The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents ap-
proached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to
her a few questions." Id at 555.
18 Justice Powell noted that he did not "expressly disagree" with Justice Stewart's con-
clusion on the seizure issue, but he indicated that the question of whether Mendenhall would
reasonably feel free to leave when asked to produce her ticket and identification was "ex-
tremely close." Id at 560 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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at the initial contact and concluded that it was justified given the
agents' reasonable suspicion. Once again, Justice Powell used a bal-
ancing analysis similar to the approach employed by the Court in
Te ry. He stated that fourth amendment jurisprudence requires con-
sidering the need for effective law enforcement along with each citi-
zen's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 19
Like the concurring Justices in Mendenhall, the dissenting Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, assumed that a seizure had oc-
curred at the initial contact.20 Unlike the concurring Justices,
however, the dissenters believed that the agents lacked specific and
articulable grounds upon which to justify the seizure.2' For them,
the defendant's fourth amendment rights outweighed the govern-
ment's law enforcement interests. Thus, the agents' "seizure" of
Mendenhall was unreasonable. 22
The United States Supreme Court once again considered the
constitutionality of airport drug stops in Reid v. Georgia.23 Holding
that the agent lacked sufficient justification for making the seizure,
the Court reversed Reid's conviction.2 4 Only Justice Rehnquist
would have upheld the conviction by following Justice Stewart's
opinion in Mendenhall.25 While refusing to address the seizure issue,
since it had not been litigated at the trial level, Justice Powell noted
19 He added: "[t]he careful and commendable police work that led to the criminal con-
viction at issue in this case satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Id at 565-
66 (Powell, J., concurring).
20 Justice White criticized the Stewart opinion for reversing the judgment of the court of
appeals on the basis of a fact-bound standard which the defendant did not litigate in the
lower court. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., dissenting).
21 The dissent challenged the government's reliance in this case on the drug courier pro-
file as insufficient in itself to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure. See id
at 572-73 (White, J., dissenting).
22 "Because Agent Anderson's suspicion that Ms. Mendenhall was transporting narcotics
could be based only on 'his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch,"' rather than
'specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experi-
ence,' he was not justified in 'seizing' Ms. Mendenhall." Id at 573 (citations omitted) (White,
J., dissenting).
23 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). In Reid, a DEA agent had approached two suspects
whose behavior fit the drug courier profile. The agent identified himself and asked to see the
men's airline tickets and identification. According to the agent, the two men appeared ner-
vous during this initial encounter. In response to the agent's request, the two men consented
to accompany the agent inside the terminal for a search of their shoulder bags and their
persons. Once inside the terminal, however, the defendant abandoned his bag and began to
run. The bag was later found to contain cocaine. Id at 439.
24 Five Justices joined the per curiam opinion-the four dissenters in Mendenhall and Jus-
tice Stewart.
25 See Reid, 448 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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in his concurring opinion that the seizure question remains open for
future courts to consider, "in light of the opinions [expressed] in Men-
denhall." The Court has not decided a factually similar airport
seizure case since Reid.26
II. Recent Airport Seizure Cases in the Federal Courts
When considering airport seizure cases, most United States
Courts of Appeals explicitly note that the reasonable person test does
not bind them since there is no definitive Supreme Court guidance
on the issue. 27 Nonetheless, the Courts of Appeals which have de-
26 Id at 442-43 (Powell, J., concurring).
Since Reid, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and heard the arguments in an
airport narcotics case from the Florida courts: Royer v. State, 389 So.2d. 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 631 (1981). See Addendum preceeding note 68 infra. In
Reper, the defendant was approached by two plainclothes officers, who identified themselves
and asked to talk with Royer. The officers then asked to see Royer's airline ticket and some
other identification. Royer complied with both requests. There was a discrepancy between
the names on the ticket and the driver's license. The officers then told the defendant that
they were narcotics officers and that they suspected him of transporting narcotics. Royer
became markedly nervous. Next, the officers asked Royer to accompany them to an adjacent
room. They did not tell Royer that he did not have to consent to their requests. The officers
retrieved the bags Royer had just checked and carried them about forty feet from the initial
encounter to a small office. Once in the "interrogation room," and still in the possession of
Royer's identification and plane ticket, the officers asked Royer if he would consent to a
search of both bags. Saying nothing, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases,
which contained marijuana. Royer agreed to let one of the officers pry open the other bag
with a screwdriver. The second bag also contained a large amount of marijuana. 389 So. 2d
at 1009, 1016-18.
The Florida District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, held that "[f]or all practical pur-
poses, Royer had been placed under arrest when the alleged consent was given." Id at 1019.
Finding that the officers did not have probable cause for this "arrest," the court reversed
Royer's conviction and directed that he be discharged. In reaching this decision the Florida
District Court of Appeal noted that the R yer facts were "decisively different" from those in
Mendenhall. Id at 1018 n.7. Additionally, the court declined to decide whether a fourth
amendment seizure occurred in Rayer prior to the defendants "arrest." Id at 1018 n.8.
As it was not central to the Florida court's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court may not
deal with the seizure question in the Royer case. However, the seizure issue did come up
during the oral arguments. Justice White asked defense counsel Theodore Klien whether the
citizen's reasonable belief under the circumstances should be the deciding factor for determin-
ing whether a fourth amendment seizure had occurred:
Klien: "I don't think it should, but that's what this court has said."
Justice White: In what case in which five justices agreed?
Justice Stevens: That test was formulated in the lead opinion in Mendenhall, in
which only two Justices joined." Argument Before United States Supreme court in Royer
v. State, No. 80-2146, 32 CRIM. L. REP. 4069 (Oct. 12, 1982).
It is significant to note that Justice Stewart, the author of the reasonable person test in Men-
denhall, is no longer on the bench. Thus, the Supreme Court may decide to comment on the
seizure issue in Royer.
27 See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Lara,
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cided airport seizure questions have usually adopted the reasonable
person test.28 Given the paucity of Supreme Court direction on the
matter, however, they rely on and are bound by precedent in their
particular circuits.2 9 Since airport seizures have only recently risen in
importance, the amount of precedent in any given circuit is mini-
mal.30  Thus, a court must often either analogize to other fourth
amendment cases or consider case law from other circuits. 31
While a few courts have engaged in a more eclectic analysis of
factors,32 most courts have focused primarily on the police officer's
conduct and whether it amounts to such a show of authority that a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Frequently, seemingly
minor gradations in the degree of coercion exerted by a police officer
will differentiate a seizure from a nonseizure.33 The remainder of
638 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d
979 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
28 United States v. Harrison, 667 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lara, 638
F.2d 802 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (1st Cir.
1981); United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Ander-
son, 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981).
29 Bery, 670 F.2d at 593.
30 See generally Black, 675 F.2d at 129.
31 Black, 675 F.2d at 131.
32 In Black, the Seventh Circuit stated that the seizure inquiry should focus on three
major areas: "(1) the conduct of the police; (2) the person of the individual citizen; and (3)
the physical surroundings of the encounter." Id at 134.
33 The standard of review which the appellate court applies in examining the trial record
seems highly significant given the fact-bound nature of the reasonable person test. Disagree-
ment exists as to the amount of deference which an appellate court must give to the trial
court's findings on the seizure issue. In United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir.
1981) the Ninth Circuit noted, "[t]he determination of when such a contact constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of each case." Patino concluded that since the seizure question turns largely on factual
issues, proper deference should be given to the trial court judge who heard the testimony and
his findings should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id
However, in United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 138-39 (7th Cir. 1982), Justice
Swygert, in dissent, challenged the application of the clearly erroneous standard of review. As
Justice Swygert pointed out, in determining whether or not a reasonable person would feel
free to leave "[t]he factual findings . . . [most frequently] are not in dispute." Id at 138.
Where the facts are uncontested, the determination of whether or not an individual has been
seized is a legal one, and an appellate court may exercise independent judgment in entering
its own conclusions of law. See 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 3:652 (1981).
Despite Justice Swygert's arguments, however, most appellate courts have applied a
clearly erroneous standard of review. This choice is significant given the inherently factual
orientation of the reasonable person test. Courts have acknowledged that a determination of
whether or not a reasonable person would feel free to leave often calls for a "refined judg-
ment." The application of a more stringent standard of review, however, impedes their abil-
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this part focuses on the various categories of police conduct which the
Courts of Appeals have examined in deciding the seizure question.
The analysis reviews the factual circumstances which most often re-
ceive close judicial scrutiny, and examines these fact patterns in a
chronological order roughly corresponding to their occurrence in air-
port stop situations.
A. The Initial Encounter
The degree of restraint which a police officer imposes upon a
suspect's freedom of movement is a highly relevant factor in deter-
mining whether or not a seizure has occurred.34 While under Justice
Stewart's reasonable person standard a police officer can approach a
suspect for questioning, he cannot introduce any element of force or
coercion. A citizen need not be held at gunpoint or under actual
physical restraint in order for a seizure to arise.35 Rather, a seizure
has been found where the officer's authoritative manner indicates
that the person is not free to leave.36 Thus, where the officer directly
blocks the suspect's path and impedes his movement through the
concourse, a seizure has occurred which must be justified by reason-
able and articulable suspicion.3 7 Similarly, an initial encounter in-
volving the threatening presence of several officers creates an
environment in which a reasonable person would not feel free to
leave.3
ity to make this refined judgment and has constrained their ability to fully delineate a precise
seizure test.
During oral argument for Royer, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the controversy over
the degree of deference which an appellate court must grant a lower court's findings on the
seizure issue. The Supreme Court's decision in Royer should provide some guidance on the
correct standard of review to apply in these cases. See Addendum preceeding note 68 infra.
34 United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d
583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881 (5th
Cir. 1976).
35 Black, 675 F.2d at 134. See also Elmore, 595 F.2d at 1041.
36 "[I]f officers have intimidated an individual through the use of a show of authority
sufficient to make it apparent that the individual is not free to ignore the officer and proceed
on his way, a seizure will be found." Black, 675 F.2d at 134-35.
37 Bowles, 625 F.2d 526. In Bowles, a DEA agent approached Bowles who was walking
ahead of him at a pace 'just short of a run." The agent pursued and passed Bowles, held out
his credentials, and turned to face the defendant. The agent stood directly in Bowles's path,
thus preventing him from proceeding further. The Fifth Circuit held that this action consti-
tuted a seizure since the agent had placed a restraint on Bowles's movement.
38 In United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981), a DEA agent had received
a tip from a confidential informant that a private aircraft containing narcotics had left Flor-
ida and would be arriving at the Orange County airport. When the defendant's plane ar-
rived at the airport, several DEA agents and uniformed police officers were on hand to meet
[Vol. 58:668]
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Under these circumstances, the officer's coercive conduct
amounts to a substantial intrusion upon the citizen's liberty interests
which outweighs the government's interest in law enforcement.
Courts have concluded that such coercive conduct constitutes a
seizure which must be based on constitutional justification.
B. The Questioning Phase
Even where no physical restraint occurs at the initial contact, a
seizure may arise as a result of the officer's coercive questioning.39
When the court analyzes this phase of the encounter, the seizure de-
termination often turns on such nuances as the tone of the officer's
voice and the nature of the questions asked.40 If the officer phrases his
questions in a conversational tone4t and requests but does not de-
mand to speak with the citizen, the courts may characterize the en-
counter as a non-seizure.42 But if the officer makes an offensive or
threatening request, such as approaching the citizen and immedi-
ately asking that he follow the officer to an office, the presumption
arises that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.43
Courts accept this approach noting that a reasonable person
it. Two of the agents asked permission to board the plane and a third agent asked the defend-
ant to accompany him to a nearby aviation building where they could talk. The defendant
agreed to do so, and he and his companions walked to the aviation building followed by DEA
agents carrying his luggage. Once inside, the defendants were constantly in the presence of at
least one agent or officer, even during trips to use the restroom or telephone.
Applying Justice Stewart's reasonable person test, the Ninth Circuit held that a seizure
had occurred, if not on the plane, then within the aviation building. The court noted that the
presence of five DEA agents and five uniformed police officers was one factor indicating that
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.
Similarly, in International Ladies' Garment Workers' v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1982), the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonable person test to Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service factory searches for illegal aliens to find that the authoritative presence of several
agents had produced a seizure. In addition, the court found the following aspects of the
agent's behavior relevant to the seizure question: 1) their general method of conducting the
survey; 2) their verbal announcement of authority; 3) their display of badges; 4) their posi-
tioning near factory exits; and 5) their open display of handcuffs.
39 United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d
583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
40 Wylie, 569 F.2d at 68; Black, 675 F.2d at 135; Beny, 670 F.2d at 596.
41 Beny, 670 F.2d at 596.
42 Wylie, 569 F.2d at 68.
43 In United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1981), a DEA agent stopped the
defendant and immediately after identifying himself, requested that the defendant accom-
pany him to an airport office. The court held that the agent "did not merely stop Jefferson to
ask him a few questions; he stopped him and immediately after identifying himself as a DEA
agent requested Jefferson to accompany him to the baggage claims office. In these circum-
stances, Jefferson could not reasonably believe that he was free to leave." Id at 856.
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often elects to speak with a police officer more out of a spirit of coop-
eration than a feeling of compulsion or fear. 4 However, as one com-
mentator has noted, this explanation does not seem to be the true
rationale behind the court's reasoning.45 Courts more likely tolerate
the de minimis intrusion or inconvenience caused by the officer's in-
offensive questioning to futher the government's overriding interest
in effective law enforcement. As long as the police officer does not
threaten or coerce the citizen, courts have justified the questioning as
an essential tool of law enforcement.4 6
The more difficult problem has been whether a seizure occurs
when the officer's questions focus directly on the citizen.47 A reason-
able person would feel more intimidated or coerced knowing that he
is the subject of a police investigation.48 Nevertheless, the mere fact
that the officer's questions focus on the citizen does not, by itself, give
rise to a fourth amendment intrusion.49 When the officer's questions
become focused to the extent of being intimidating or accusatory,
however, a possible watershed point in the seizure analysis may have
been reached. 50 For example, statements by the officer that he sus-
pects the citizen of smuggling drugs, 5' or that an innocent person
would consent to a search,5 2 may transform this otherwise innocuous
encounter into an unjustified seizure.53
C. The Request for Identiftation
Assuming the agent's initial questioning is not so coercive or fo-
cused as to constitute a seizure, one particular aspect of the question-
ing-a request for identification-may cause the encounter to
become a seizure. In virtually all airport drug cases, the agent asks
for identification from the person with whom he is speaking. The
authority to ask for identification is important. A discrepancy be-
tween the name on a plane ticket and a driver's license, combined
44 Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Ramirez-
Cifuentes, 682 F.2d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, C.J. concurring).
45 W. LaFave, a leading authority in criminal law noted, "It is nothing more than a
fiction to say that all of these suspects have consented to the confrontation." W. LAFAvE, 3
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2 (1978).
46 Id § 9.2, at 55.
47 Gomez, 672 F.2d at 143; Berr,, 670 F.2d at 597.
48 Patino, 649 F.2d at 727 (9th Cir. 1981); Black, 675 F.2d at 139 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
49 Gomez, 672 F.2d at 143.
50 Berry, 670 F.2d at 597.
51 Robinson, 625 F.2d at 1217.
52 Setter, 654 F.2d at 358.
53 Ber,, 670 F.2d at 597.
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with other articulable facts, is often sufficient grounds to allow the
officer to make an investigatory stop. 54
A request for identification during noncoercive questioning does
not constitute a seizure per se.55 However, the officer either retaining
an identification document for a lengthy period of time, or asking the
suspect to consent to a search while the officer holds the requested
identification, may constitute a seizure. When an officer unnecces-
sarily retains either a driver's license or an airplane ticket, courts find
that the person could not feel free to leave and is thus seized under
the reasonable person test.56 Document retention and freedom of
movement are simply inconsistent, and the individual's liberty inter-
est prevails in that situation. 57
Even if the officer holds the piece of identification for only a
short time, requesting the suspect to consent to a search while the
officer has the driver's license or airline ticket may also constitute a
seizure. The court will consider whether the suspect, deprived of a
license or travel papers, could reasonably believe from the officer's
search request that the investigation was so focused upon him that he
was not free to leave. Thus, a seizure might occur even when the
officer does not retain the identification for an extended time
period.58
The Courts of Appeals scrutinize the identification request and
production process very closely.59 License or ticket retention is prob-
ably the most frequently cited point at which a seizure occurs in air-
54 United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Herbst 641 F.2d
1161 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
55 Comez, 672 F.2d at 142; Black, 675 F.2d at 136. In Gomez, the court stated that "the
nature of this question alone without reference to the demeanor of the officer, the tone of
voice used, or any other circumstance, cannot convert an otherwise inoffensive encounter into
a seizure." However, if the attendant circumstances indicate coercion, the identification
question could sufficiently impair freedom to leave and would constitute a seizure. Gomez,
672 F.2d at 142.
56 Elsoffer, 671 F.2d at 1297. Retention of either the ticket or driver's license may violate
the reasonable person test. First, if a person is waiting to board an outgoing flight, police
retention of his airplane ticket alone is a patent infringement on free movement. Id. Second,
whenever a person is deprived of a driver's license, his mobility is restricted because one could
never freely abandon such an important document. United States v. Viegas, 637 F.2d 42, 44
n.3 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 140 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
57 Elsqfr, 671 F.2d at 1297. The dissenters in Mendenhall also recognized this point say-
ing "[ilt is doubtful that any reasonable person about to board a plane would feel free to leave
when law enforcement officers have her plane ticket." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 570 n.3. (White
J., dissenting).
58 See generally United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1980).
59 Berry, 670 F.2d at 597, 603 n.26.
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port stop cases.60 Courts take a hard look at this situation because
production of personal papers is so intrusive into personal liberty.
While a mere request for identification is not a seizure, any coercive
conduct in the request for or retention of the document will tip the
fourth amendment balance toward personal liberty and away from
the government's drug enforcement interest. 6'
III. An Evaluation of the Seizure Concept
The reasonable person standard from Mendenhall has provided
the mechanism, the theoretical scale, by which the courts weigh the
relevant values in airport police-citizen encounters.6 2 As they have
struggled in applying the reasonable person test to various unique
fact situations, however, the courts have striven to objectify the test.63
The courts' evaluations of the airport seizure cases reveal the evolu-
tion of discrete categories of seizure and non-seizure circumstances.
Indeed, the federal courts have made the seizure determinations in
recent airport encounter cases in a surprisingly uniform manner.64
60 See generaly Berry, 670 F.2d 583; ElsoJfer, 671 F.2d 1294; Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036; Black,
675 F.2d 129; Viegas, 639 F.2d 42.
61 Berry, 670 F.2d at 597.
62 Some state courts have adopted standards for seizure determinations different from
Stewart's reasonable person test in M4endenkall. For example, seeln re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888,
582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Cal. 1978) in which the Supreme Court of California
looked to the purpose for which the officer approached the citizen. If the encounter was
initiated because the officer suspected the citizen of criminal activity, then a seizure has oc-
curred and the officer must provide objective justification for his actions. New York courts
have applied an intricate "sliding scale" of justification to all levels of police-citizen en-
counters. See People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y.
1976). Nevertheless, the scope of this recent decisions piece has been confined to the seizure
determination process in the federal judicial system.
63 Professor LaFave advocates a practical application of the reasonable person test. See
note 67 infra and accompanying text. LaFave concludes that an objective test is the best
approach for seizure determinations. He reaches this conclusion after rejecting the available
alternatives of a "perception-of-the-suspect test," a test which characterizes all police-citizen
encounters as seizures except those "where the citizen has consented to the confrontation,"
and a test which focuses "upon the intention of the officer involved in the street encounter."
See W. LaFave, supra note 45, § 9.2. Professor LaFave later noted that the objective test he
advocated was subsequently adopted by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall. Id at § 9.2 (1978 &
Supp. 1982).
64 Of course, the seizure determinations by the courts have not been unanimous. As with
any standard, particularly in its developing stages, reasonable judges can and do differ when
they attempt to apply the standard to a set of facts. For example, in Mendenhall, Justice
Powell characterized as "extremely close" the issue of whether the defendant was seized when
two government agents asked for her driver's license. 446 U.S. at 560 n. I (Powell J., concur-
ring). The dissenters would have looked to additional "objective facts" which, in their view,
were vital to the seizure determination and which they maintained Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist had overlooked. 446 U.S. at 570 (White J., dissenting) . See also Judge Swygert's
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The chief criticism of the federal courts' use of the reasonable
person standard results from the critics' literal reading and applica-
tion of the test.65 After establishing that average, reasonable citizens
feel naturally compelled to cooperate with (or at the very least to
respond to) inquiring police officers, critics conclude that virtually all
police-citizen encounters are seizures within the meaning of the Stew-
art analysis.66 Although the reasonable person standard could be so
literally applied, the courts have not been receptive to this criticism.
Instead, they have recognized that effective law enforcement necessi-
tates police contact with the citizenry, and have applied the reason-
able person test accordingly.
In short, the federal courts have used the reasonable person bal-
ancing process, but their scales have not been entirely true. Judicial
recognition of weighty government interests frequently prevails in
airport narcotics cases. This recognition has in turn influenced the
manner in which the courts have applied the reasonable person test.
The courts have generally disregarded the factor of compulsion to
cooperate which is inherent in all interactions between police and
citizens. They have then attempted to objectively evaluate the other
circumstances of each case to determine whether "the officers added
to those inherent pressures by engaging in menacing conduct signifi-
cantly beyond that which is accepted in social conduct. '67
Disregarding the citizen's natural compulsion to cooperate with
a DEA agent, the courts ask whether an objective, reasonable person,
dissenting opinion in Black, 675 F.2d at 138, for criticism of both the reasonable person test
("[a]n overly-restrictive definition of a seizure isolates police-citizen contacts from constitu-
tional safeguards by removing them from judicial scrutiny") and the majority's application of
the test in the Black decision.
65 Professor LaFave observed that if the courts were to say that a police-citizen encounter
is a seizure unless "a reasonably prudent person would believe he was free to go," a realistic
application of this standard "would seem to put the great majority of street encounters into
the seizure category, for when confronted by a policeman 'the average person encountered
will feel obligated to stop and respond."' W. LAFAV E, supra note 45, § 9.2 (citations omitted).
66 See generaly Note, Reformulating Seizures-Airport Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1486 (1981); Note, Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Is the
Supreme Court's Case of Confision in its Terminal Stage? 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 216 (1981).
67 W. LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 9.2. Expounding upon the justification underlying the
courts' more practical reading of the reasonable person test, LaFave points out that the moral
and instinctive pressures on citizens to cooperate with the police are not inherently bad. He
maintains that citizen-police encounters should not be deemed fourth amendment seizures
merely because citizens have responded to those pressures. Rather, the critical inquiry should
be "whether the policeman, although perhaps making inquiries which a private citizen would
not be expected to make, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner consistent with what
could be viewed as a nonoffensive contact if it occured between two ordinary citizens." Id at
§ 9.2 (1978 & Supp. 1982) (citations omitted).
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who is not carrying illegal drugs on his person and who has commit-
ted no felonies, under the circumstances of the particular encounter
would feel that he was free to leave when approached by the officer.
If he would not, then the citizen was seized. The seizure is illegal if
the officer cannot provide Terry justification for the seizure. 68 Courts
have created some confusion by stating the reasonable person test
and then implicitly, rather than explicitly, applying the test in this
practical manner.
Although federal courts have not always been frank regarding
the accuracy of the scales they employ, their various balancing
processes have resulted in seizure determinations which are basically
consistent. Of course, uniformity in the application of the reasonable
person standard is a chimeric goal, given the myriad of fact situations
to which it might be applied. Nevertheless, the reasonable person
standard is becoming clearer and more objective with each seizure
determination the courts make. As the federal courts continue to
hear airport encounter cases, the reasonable person standard will be-
come more sharply defined and the seizure/non-seizure division will
be more clearly delineated.
Emilyj. Dark
Steven K. Sharpe
Dana L. Eismeier
Addendum
As thi piece was going to press, the Supreme Court decided State v.
Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4293 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1983) (No. 80-2146). The
plurality opinion written by Justice White and joined in by Justices Marshall,
Powell and Stevens, supports the Courts of Appeals' seizure determination pro-
cess discrsed above. The opinion stated that the ofers" initial approach and
questioning of Royer was constitutionally permissible, that the ofcers had efec-
tivey "seized" Royer when they asked him to accompany them to the interroga-
tion room while still retaining his travel documents, but that the ofers had
articulable suspicion for the seizure. However, the plurality opinion asserted
68 LaFave explains that this practical application of the objective reasonable person test
strikes an appropriate balance between government and fourth amendment interests.
Police would remain free to seek cooperation from citizens on the street without
being called upon to articulate a certain level of suspicion in justification if a partic-
ular encounter proved fruitful, but yet the public would be protected from any
coercion other than that which is inherent in a police-citizen encounter.
W. LAFAVE, supra, note 45, § 9.2. LaFave maintains that this method of a seizure deter-
mination process is in harmony with fourth amendment precedent.
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that by the tine the officers requested the key to Royer's suitcase, the seizure had
escalated into a practical arrest, unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 4296.
Thus, the Court afirmed the Florida Court of Appeal's reversal of Royer's con-
viction. See note 26 supra. Significantly, although the opinion used the lan-
guage of justice Stewart's test in Mendenhall, the plurality nevertheless
refused to "suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consen-
sual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the
bounds of an investigative stop. " Id. at 4297
Justice Brennan concurred in the result but disagreed with the pluralit/s
assessment that the initial stop of Royer was legal, maintaining that Royer was
impermissibly seized when asked to produce his ticket and identification. Id. at
4298.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion which the Chief Justice and
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist stressed the "reasonableness" of the
policemen's conduct at all stages of the encounter. In a separate dissent, Justice
Blackmun emphasized the significance of the law enforcement interests in this
particular fourth amendment balance.
